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Abstract
With 134 million active stock accounts and approximately two decades of history, the Chinese
securities markets are still fairly young. In 2010, the Chinese securities markets had 2,171 listed
companies with domestic IPOs, a total market value of approximately $4.2 trillion dollars and a
total value of approximately $8.6 trillion dollars in completed transactions. With an exponentially
growing number of securities transactions taking place on the Chinese stock exchanges, more listed
companies have been investigated and penalized for securities misconduct. But given the nascent
nature of the Chinese civil legal system in providing monetary compensation to injured public
investors, this article discusses using arbitration as an alternative method to resolve securities viola-
tions and suggests that the American FINRA arbitration process can serve as a model to improve
the Chinese arbitration process.
I. Introduction
Arbitration is not a novel concept in China. Indeed, aside from legal consultation, ad-
ministrative complaint, civil lawsuit, and mediation, securities arbitration is already availa-
ble to redress Chinese investors' grievances. 1 But China's securities arbitration system is
arguably still in its incipient stage. To better protect investors' rights and interests, this
paper proposes that the American securities system established under the Financial Indus-
try Regulatory Authority (FINRA) can serve as a model for improving the Chinese securi-
ties arbitration system.
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matters, J.D., Cornell Law School, S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, S.B., Massachusetts Institute
ofTechnology. The author would like to thank Professor William A. Jacobson of the Cornell Law School
Securities Law Clinic for his invaluable comments on a prior version of this article. The author would also
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1. How Can Securities Investors Protect Their Interests, CHINA SEC. REG. CONtM'N (Dec. 5, 2007), http://
www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/xiamen/xxfw/tzzbh/200712/t20071205_88200.htm (China).
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Part II begins with an anecdote illustrating the market vulnerabilities faced by Chinese
public investors. Part HI discusses the Chinese civil litigation process, with a focus on
securities litigation, and explains China's need for an investor-friendly alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) forum-a -need that has been recognized by the Chinese legal scholarly
community. Part IV summarizes Chinese arbitration laws and analyzes its securities arbi-
tration system. Part V examines the FINRA arbitration system. And Part VI proposes.
adopting some characteristics of the FINRA arbitration system to better serve Chinese
public investors' interests.
II. Chinese Securities Markets and the Blue-Chip Company Yinguang Xia
With 134 million active stock accounts in 20102 and approximately two decades of his-
tory, Chinese securities markets are fairly young. Yet by 2010, the Shanghai Stock Ex-
change 3 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange4, two independent exchanges operating in
China, had become the world's sixth and sixteenth largest equity markets by domestic
market capitalization, respectively.5 By the end of 2010, China's markets had 2,171 listed
companies with domestic IPOs, encompassing a total market value of 26.54 trillion yuan
(approximately $4.2 trillion) and a total value of 54.6 trillion yuan (approximately $8.6
trillion) in completed transactions. 6 From an empirical perspective the Chinese securities
markets have been prosperous and have played a significant role in supporting the devel-
opment of the Chinese socialist market economy.
As the number of securities transactions continues to increase exponentially, more and
more listed domestic companies have been investigated and penalized for misconduct such
as insider trading, misrepresentation, and market manipulation. One highly publicized
corporate misconduct case emerged in 2001 when the well-respected Chinese financial
magazine Caijing Magazine exposed that Yinguang Xia, a blue-chip technology company,
was forging its accounting methods. 7 Yinguang Xia's misconduct had a devastating impact
on investors, who were misinformed on the existence of a multi-year, contract worth six
billion yuan (approximately $942 million).8 The Caiing article triggered an official inves-
tigation into Yinguang Xia, which found that over a three-year period, Yinguang Xia had
overinflated profits by more than 762 million yuan (approximately $122 million).9
2. December 2010 Statistics, CHINA SEC. REG. COMm'N (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/
zjhpublic/G0O306204/zqscyb/201101/t201 10126_191194.htm (China).
3. Shanghai Stock Exchange: Brief Introduction, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.sse.com.cn/sse
portal/en-us/ps/about/bi.shtml (last visited June 3, 2012). The Shanghai Stock Exchange was founded on
November 26, 1990. Id.
4. SZSE Overview, SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.szse.cn/main/en/aboutsse/sseoverview/
(last visited June 3, 2012). The Shenzhen Stock Exchange was established on December 1, 1990. Id.
5. January 2011 Market Statistics, WORLD FED'N EXCHANGES, http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics
/annual/2010/equity-markets/domestic-market-capitalization (last visited June 3, 2012).
6. Statistics from December 2010, supra note 2.
7. See Ling Huawei & Wang Shuo, Yingtang Xia Xianjing [The Guangxia Trap], CAIJLNG FIN. MAG. (Aug.
7, 2001, 11:01 AM), http://finance.sina.com.cn/t/20010807/92215.html (China).
8. Id.
9. See Jin Liping, Caijing: Yin Sheji Yinguang Xia Zhaojia An Zhongtian Qin Bengta [Caijing: The Collapse
Following YinguangXia's Fraud Case], Aug. 5, 2001, http://finance.sina.com.cn/o/20011230/160433.html (last
visited June 16, 2012).
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Yinguang Xia's misconduct had a devastating impact on its investors, and a slew of inves-
tors filed civil suits seeking damages against the company1 0
At the time, the case implicated about 847 investors, who were spread across over
twenty provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions and who were seeking over 180
million yuan (approximately $28.9 million) in monetary damages." In September 2001,
the first set of civil claims against Yinguang Xia was filed by investors residing in Wuxi
City, Jiangsu Province, 12 and the claims were accepted by the People's Court for Wuxi
City, Chong'an District.' 3 But the Wuxi People's Court soon received instructions to stay
the civil claims in anticipation of further instructions from the Supreme People's Court
(SPC), the highest court in China.' 4 On January 15, 2002, the SPC issued a notice order-
ing a temporary freeze on all civil securities claims.' 5 It took another six years to fully
resolve the Yinguang Xia case, with the plaintiffs' damages paid in the form of additional
shares in the company.'
6
The story of Yinguang Xia exemplifies the difficulties Chinese public investors face
when they seek civil compensation for securities law violations through the judicial pro-
cess. The continuing boom of the Chinese securities markets throughout the 2000s is
mirrored by the severe losses suffered by public investors. With its markets developing at
a swift pace, China has turned to focusing on constructing a complementary securities
legal infrastructure. Despite the progress it has made, Chinese public investors seeking
civil compensation continue to face a judicial mechanism that is unable to provide them
with sufficient protect.
I. Civil Securities Litigation in China
A. COMMENCING A CML CLAM
The Chinese judicial system and its civil litigation process are similar to their American
counterparts. China has a four-level court system. The basic courts, China's trial courts,
have general jurisdiction over most civil cases, with certain classes of cases, such as mari-
time claims, delegated to specialty courts.' 7 The intermediate and high courts, China's
appellate courts, have limited jurisdiction-they can hear appeals and try cases involving
10. Id.
11. See 0N : (Tao Yushen), I[ W-9ZINK, ti_] P:Pr*K -i., (Yingwang Xia Xujia Chenshu
Zhengquan Minshi Peichang An Lushi Shonji) [Lawyer's Notes of the Guangxia False Statenents in Securities Civil
Compensation Case], LEGAL DAILY (May 25, 2007), available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zinbm/content/
2009-01/22/content 1025525.htm (China). http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zmbin/content/200 9 -01/ 22 /
content_1025525.htm (China).
12. See Wang Lu, Redian jzjiao: Yibo Duozhe De Yinguang Xia Peichang An [Spotlight: Many Twists in the
YinguangXia Compensation Case], SINA.cOM (Sept. 27, 2011, 8:49 AM), http://finance.sina.com.cn/t/20010927
/11 1977.html (China).
13. See Wuxia Fayuan Zan Be Shenli Yinguang Xia Suopei An [Wuxia Court Tentporarily Stays Hearing on
Yinguang Xia], NErEASE (Sept. 24, 2001, 4:08 PM), http://money.163.com/editor/stockchange-folder/
010924_62091.html (China).
14. See id.
15. Tao, supra note 11.
16. Id.
17. Jun Ge, Mediation, Arbitration and Litigation: Dispute Resolution in the People's Republic of China, 15 UCLA
PAC. BASIN LJ. 122, 134 (1997).
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significant amounts of money or having an important social impact.18 The SPC presides
over all lower courts as the supervising organ.19 To commence a civil action in China, like
in America, a plaintiff begins by filing a written complaint, which sets forth the claim, the
facts, the legal grounds upon which the claim is based, and any available supporting
evidence.2
0
B. THE CHINESE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CrIL SECURITIES SUITS
As previously suggested, although the Chinese securities markets have matured in the
past twenty years, the laws that protect public investors have lagged. The Company Law
of China2' (Company Law) aid the Securities Law of China22 (Securities Law) are the two
reigning bodies of law that protect Chinese public investors' rights and interests. Within
the context of securities litigation, the Company Law ensures that public investors have
access to information about limited liability companies, such as their names, registered
addresses, legal representatives, registered capital, business classification, scope of busi-
ness, and identity of shareholders. 23 The Securities Law standardizes securities trading
and issuance, creates regulatory bodies for the exchanges, and provides legal liabilities for
certain violations.
24
Although these two bodies of law have supplied the building blocks to a functioning
securities market structure, the civil remedies available under these laws have remained
limited. For example, scholars have argued that the Company Law does not arm Chinese
public investors with enforceable legal rights such as shareholder derivative suits,2 5 pierc-
ing the corporate veil,26 or fiduciary duties, 27 nor does the Securities Law provide Chinese
public investors with a clear, enforceable cause of action to bring civil claims against in-
sider-trading.28
Instead, the Chinese state has relied upon administrative and criminal penalties to rem-
edy infractions in the securities industry, and until 1998, no civil securities claim was ever
filed in China.29 The first one was brought in a basic court by a public investor, who




21. Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (OMAR Rl[ -M) [Company Law of the People's
Republic of China] (by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006)
(China) [hereinafter Company Law].
22. Zhonghua Renning Gongheguo Zhenquan Fa (iM ) [Securities Law of the People's Republic of
China) (promulgated by the Standing Conmi. Nat' People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006)
(China) [hereinafter Securities Law].
23. Company Law, supra note 21, art. 32.
24. Securities Law, supra note 22, chs. 11, VII, XI.
25. See Baoshu Wang & Hui Huang, China's New Company Law and Securities Law: An Overview and Assess-
ment, 19 AUSTL. J. Coaty. L. 229, 241 (2006).
26. Id.
27. See Rebecca Lee, Fiduciary Duty without Equity: Fiduciary Duties of Directors Under the Revised Company
Law of the PRC, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 897, 902 (2007).
28. Securities Law, siupra note 22, art. 63.
29. Li Peng, Discussion on the Structure of Civil Securities Litigation, 2 J. oF X1NJIANG FIN. & ECON. L-,,sT.
41, 43 (2002) (China).
30. Id.
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claim on the ground that all securities-related violations were under the jurisdiction of the
appropriate administrative agency.31 It is no surprise, then, that three years later the Chi-
nese court system was unequipped to handle the influx of Yinguang Xia claims.
Faced with public investors harmed by Yinguang Xia and recognizing China's judicial
shortcomings, the SPC took action and stayed the Yinguang Xia litigation.32 On Septem-
ber 21, 2001, the SPC temporarily disallowed all lower courts from accepting securities
cases that sought civil compensation for insider trading, fraud, market manipulation, and
other misconduct of listed companies. 33 At the time, Chinese legal scholars agreed with
the SPC's decision. 34 The SPC was concerned that (1) the claims filed by the aggrieved
investors seeking civil damages were cases of first-impression for the courts; (2) the vari-
ous courts would arrive at different results on these claims even though all the investors
were similarly harmed by the same company; (3) the various courts would reach their
decisions at different times, which would have enabled some investors to recover before
others; and (4) the basic courts lacked the expertise to handle such cases.35 Thus, the stay
bought time for the SPC to implement a strategy for adjudicating civil securities claims
that ensured fairness to investors.
Following the stay, the SPC moved to build a legal infrastructure capable of adjudicat-
ing securities litigation. On January 15, 2002, the SPC promulgated the Notice of the
Supreme People's Court on the Relevant Issues Concerning the Acceptance of Cases of
Disputes over Civil Tort Arising from False Statement in the Securities Market (2002
Notice). 36 Through the notice, the SPC granted lower courts the jurisdiction to accept
cases where public investors sought civil compensation for false statements made by listed
companies.37 For procedural and substantive rules that would govern civil securities cases,
the SPC issued Some Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Trying Cases of Civil
Compensation Arising from False Statements in Securities Market (2003 Provisions), ef-
fective February 1, 2003.38
The 2003 Provisions were the SPC's first attempt to provide judicial interpretation on
the substantive and procedural rules of civil securities cases.39 The 2003 Provisions con-
tain eight sections. Under Article 2, any individual, legal person, or organization can be a
31. Id.
32. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyushe Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Zanbuyu Shouli De Tongzhi INotice of the
Supreme People's Court on Refitsing to Accept Civil Compensation Cases Involving Securities for the Time Being],
LAw-LIB.COM, http://www.law-lib.com/law/lawview.asp?id=16373 (last visited July 12, 2012) (China).
33. Sup. People's Ct., Supreme People's Court on the Admissibility of the Notice of the Issues Related to the Stock
Market Caused by Misrepresentation in Tort Disputes (Sept. 21, 2001), http://www.law-lib.com/law/law-view
.asp?id=16373 (China).
34. Zhuigao Fayuan Geshoufa: Zanbu Shouli Zhengquan Minsbi Peichang You Daoli [Supreme People's Court has
Good Reasons to Refuse to Accept Civil Compensation Cases Involving Securities], SoHu.coM (Oct. 11, 2011, 11:45
AM), http://news.sohu.com/63/57/news146875763.shunl (China).
35. See id.
36. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, supra note 32.
37. Id.
38. Some Provisions of Supreme People's Court on Trying Cases Involving False Statements Related to
Securities Market, (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct. Judicial Comm., Dec. 26, 2002, effective Feb. 1,
2003) (China), available at http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/civil-
proceedings/some-provisions-of-supreme-peoples-court-on-tryingcases-involving-false-statements-reated-
to-securities-market-2002.html [hereinafter 2003 Provisions].
39. Id.
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plaintiff in a civil securities dispute. 40 Article 3 provides that transactions conducted
outside of a government-approved securities market or conducted on a secondary market
are beyond the scope of the 2003 Provisions.4 1 Article 4 stresses that courts should medi-
ate between parties and encourage settlements.42 Article 5 provides that the statute of
limitations to bring a false-statements claim starts on the day an administrative penalty is
issued or the day a criminal order is made effective. 43 Articles 8 and 9 require civil securi-
ties cases to be brought directly to an intermediate court rather than a basic court.4-
The 2003 Provisions also distinguish civil securities litigation from general civil litiga-
tion. Article 12 of the 2003 Provisions allows an aggrieved investor to bring a claim
against a listed company for false statements on his own behalf, or he can join other simi-
larly injured plaintiffs. 45 But unlike general civil litigation where courts will accept a class
of plaintiffs regardless of whether the class is pre-determined, civil securities litigation
requires those investors who choose to form a class to determine the number of class
plaintiffs prior to the trial.46 By requiring pre-determined classes, the 2003 Provision
makes it difficult for investors to bring class actions and lowers the probability that large-
scale securities claims will destabilize markets. 47
Finally, if an aggrieved investor plaintiff prevails in court, the 2003 Provisions provide a
formula to calculate monetary damages. Under Article 30, damages are calculated based
on a formula that accounts for the buying and the selling prices, the commissions paid by
investors, and the interest as computed based on the bank deposit interest.48
Despite the SPC's efforts to provide a set of substantive and procedural rules to govern
civil securities claims, the 2002 Notice and the 2003 Provisions delineate a narrow set of
acceptable civil securities claims. The jurisdiction of the courts extends only to securities
disputes arising from false statements. 49 Civil securities suits that involve insider trading,
market manipulation or other misconduct by listed companies are still beyond the juris-
diction of the courts.50 The definition of securities market excludes disputes that arise
from transactions on secondary or tertiary markets and excludes negotiated transfer of
non-traded shares.51 In addition, an aggrieved public investor can bring a civil securities
claim only if a court or an agency has confirmed the defendant company's violation
through an administrative or criminal ruling, making such a ruling a prerequisite to civil
securities litigation. 52 In practice, to recover monetary damages, an investor plaintiff must
obtain a favorable administrative or criminal ruling and prevail in the subsequent civil
trial. 53 This procedural requirement places the probability of monetary recovery for an
40. Id. art. 2.
41. Id. art. 3.
42. Id. art. 4.
43. Id. art. 5.
44. Id. arts. 8-9.
45. Id. art. 12.
46. See id. art. 14.
47. Chen Jian-Jun, Comments on the System of Civil Reparations Resnltingfrom False Statements in Chinese Stock
Market, 2 J. YANGZI-OU POLYT'ECHNIC C. 16, 18 (2003).
48. 2003 Provisions, supra note 38, art 30.
49. Id. art. 1.
50. See id.
51. Id. art. 3.
52. Id. art. 5.
53. Id.
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aggrieved investor at approximately twenty-five percent at best before a claim is even
filed. 54
Beyond the obstacles to filing a civil securities claim, Chinese legal scholars have noted
other difficulties that investor plaintiffs face before trial.55 For instance, the 2003 Provi-
sions uses a "plaintiff accommodates defendant principle" in determining the venue.5 6
That is, an investor plaintiff must file the case at an intermediate court located in the city
or province where the defendant company is located.5 7 This principle places a burden on
public investors to travel and exposes plaintiffs to the problem of local judicial protection-
ism. Local courts depend on local government organs for budgets, personnel, housing,
and other benefits, and local governments rely on the good will of local companies to meet
goals in economic growth.5S As a result, local courts are reluctant to rule against listed
companies. 59
An additional hurdle for investor plaintiffs is that under the 2003 Provisions, courts will
find a causal relationship between the investor plaintiff's loss and the defendant company's
false statement-and thus, liability for the defendant company-only if the information
was disclosed at specific times. 60 This strict causation test prohibits investors from recov-
ering on securities sold before the existence of false statements was made public through
national media, even if the sale took place because of the suspected misinformation. 6i
The discussion so far on civil securities litigation in China only highlights a handful of
problems that public investors have to face when seeking judicial remedies to their inju-
ries. Given the existing legal uncertainties and obstacles, using arbitration to resolve se-
curities disputes and recover monetary losses can be a powerful and much-needed
alternative option for aggrieved investors.
IV. Securities Arbitration in China
A. CHINESE ARBITRATION SYSTEM
Arbitration in China finds its roots in the teachings of Confucianism. 62 The modern
embodiment of the ancient principles is the Arbitration Law of China. Enacted in 1995,
54. Assuming a two-outcome event where a plaintiff has a fifty percent chance of winning a claim and a fifty
percent chance of losing a claim, the probability of a successful criminal conviction and a successful civil claim
is the probability of a successful criminal conviction times the probability of a successful civil claim, which
equals twenty-five percent (0.50 * 0. 50 = 0.25). If the probability of prevailing in an administrative or crimi-
nal securities proceeding is less than fifty percent, then the probability of monetary recovery for a plaintiff
could be less than twenty-five percent before a civil claim is filed.
55. See generally Song Shi-Xin, Disaission of the Mechanims of Resolving Securities Disputes, 18 J. GUANGXIA
ADMIN. CADRE INST. POL. & L. 46 (2003); Zhang Shao-Hua, Securities Dispute: Analysis of Two Dispute Solu-
tion Processes, 26 MoD. EcoN. Sci. 20 (2004); Zhao Chun-Lan, Discussing Mechanism of Resolving Civil Securi-
ties Dispute, 3 POL. & L. 61 (2006).
56. 2003 Provisions, supra note 38, art. 9; see also Zhang, supra note 55, at 22; Zhao, supra note 55, at 61.
57. 2003 Provisions, supra note 38, art. 9.
58. Liu Zuoxiang, A Criticism of Judicial Local Protectionism in China, 1 CASS J. L. 83 (2003).
59. Id.
60. 2003 Provisions, supra note 38, arts. 18-20; see also Ling Dai, The Judicial Application of the Causation Test
of the False Statement Doctrine in Securities Litigation in China, 15 PAc. RLno L. & POL'v J. 734 (2006).
61. 2003 Provisions, supra note 38, art. 19(1); see Dai, supra note 60, at 746.
62. See Ge, supra note 17, at 128.
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the Arbitration Law governs all types of arbitration, including securities arbitration. 63 Ar-
ticle 4 of the Arbitration Law permits arbitration if both parties agree to the method;
without mutual consent, an arbitration committee does not have the authority to hear a
dispute.64 Article 5 provides that once parties mutually consent to an arbitration agree-
ment, either before or after a dispute, the courts no longer have jurisdiction over the
dispute unless the arbitration agreement is invalid.65 If a court mistakenly accepts a case
where a valid arbitration agreement exists, the adverse party can move to dismiss the case
under Article 26 of the Arbitration Law.66 But if the adverse party fails to make the mo-
tion, the court then will have jurisdiction because the failure effectively voids the arbitra-
tion agreement. 67
A valid arbitration agreement must include the parties' mutual consent to submit their
dispute to arbitration, the matters to be arbitrated, and the parties' chosen arbitration
commission.6s A court or an arbitration committee can resolve questions about the valid-
ity of an arbitration agreement.6 9 In the case where one party submits a validity question
to an arbitration committee and the other party submits to a court, the court will give the
decisive ruling. 70
To file a claim with an arbitration commission, a party must submit a statement of the
claim and the evidence that supports the claim. 71 Upon accepting a dispute, the commis-
sion will impanel a committee, and the parties can choose either a three-member commit-
tee or a one-member committee.72 If the parties choose a three-member committee, then
the commission can staff the committee or each party can each choose an arbitrator, and
the third arbitrator will be jointly selected or designated by the commission. 73 If the par-
ties choose a one-member committee, they can jointly select the arbitrator or allow the
commission to appoint one.
74
In rendering its judgment, an arbitration commission may conduct its own fact discov-
ery.75 All arbitration proceedings must be free from any intervention by administrative
organs. 76 All arbitrations are conducted in private. 77 Only the parties to the arbitration,
the members of the arbitration committee, and the members of the arbitration agency can
participate in the arbitration process. In addition, an arbitration judgment can be pub-
lished only with the consent of the parties.78 An arbitration judgment is based on the
63. Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), 1995 China Law LEXIS 706 (China) [hereinafter Arbitration
Law].
64. Id. art. 4.
65. Id. art. 5.
66. Id. art. 26.
67. Id.
68. Id. art. 16.
69. Id. art. 20.
70. Id.
71. Id. art. 23.
72. Id. art. 30.
73. Id. art. 31.
74. Id.
75. Id. art. 43.
76. Id. art. 8.
77. Id. art. 40.
78. Id. art. 54.
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opinion of the majority of arbitrators. 79 The parties may request a court to enforce the
judgment, and the court must enforce the award.80 Once arbitration is concluded, both
parties are barred from seeking a judicial hearing on the dispute, and neither party has a
right to seek a reconsideration of the claim by the same or a different arbitration
committee.8 l
Arbitration awards may be reviewed by the courts. Under Article 58 of the Arbitration
Law, a party can ask intermediate courts to invalidate an arbitration judgment only if any
one of six conditions exists: (1) no arbitration agreement exists; (2) the subject-matter of
the dispute is not within the jurisdiction of arbitration; (3) the judgment is based on
fabricated evidence; (4) the structure of the arbitration committee or the procedure vio-
lates established laws; (5) a misrepresentation by one party negates the outcome's fairness;
or (6) bribery, corruption, or abuse of discretion exists.8 2
In addition to providing a procedural framework, the Arbitration Law also provides for
the creation of arbitration commissions. Capital cities of provinces, municipalities, and
autonomous regions have the authority to form arbitration commissions.8 3 Each commis-
sion consists of one chairman, two to four vice chairmen, and seven to eleven members.
8 4
The chairman, vice chairmen, and members must be legal and trade experts or profession-
als with relevant experience.8 5 The commissions are independent from administrative or-
gans and from one another.8 6 Arbitrators must be someone with at least eight years of
arbitration or legal experience or someone with professional knowledge of economics and
trade.8 7 The China Arbitration Association, a self-regulated organization comprised of
arbitrators, oversees all arbitration commissions and formulates rules of arbitration in ac-
cordance with the Arbitration Law and the Civil Procedure Law of China. 88
In 2005, China had around 30,000 arbitrators and 185 arbitration commissions, includ-
ing the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission and the China
Maritime Arbitration Commission.8 9 By 2009, the number of arbitration commissions
climbed to 202, with a total number of 74,811 arbitrated cases. 90 The 2009 top-three
arbitration commissions were Wuhan Arbitration Commission, with 9,770 arbitrated
cases, Guanzhou Arbitration Commission, with 4,345 arbitrated cases, and Chongqing
Arbitration Commission, with 2,238 arbitrated cases. 9t
79. Id. art. 53.
80. Id. art. 62.
81. Id.
82. Id. art. 58.
83. Id. art. 10.
84. Id. art. 12.
85. Id.
86. Id. art. 14.
87. Id. art. 13.
88. Id. art. 15.
89. Geng Xiukun, Comparing Chinese and American Arbitration Acts, SHENYANG ARB. COaus'N, http://www.
syzcw.com/newsinfo.asp?id=662 (last visited June 3, 2012) (China).
90. See Shangluo Arbitration Network, 2009 Report on Nationwide Arbitration Committees, SHANGLUO ARB.
NETWORK (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.slzcw.cn/Article-Show.asp?ArticleID=560 (China).
91. Id.
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B. ARBITRATION OF SECURITIES MATTERS IN CHINA
As discussed above, arbitration is not a foreign concept to Chinese securities regulators,
but its application in resolving public investors' claims remains limited in China. The
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) provided arbitration as an alternative option for resolving
disputes for its members as early as 1990.92 Subsequently, the SSE promulgated twenty-
six rules that established an internal arbitration system. 93 Under the SSE, arbitration was
not used to resolve a broad category of securities disputes, rather the SSE used arbitration
to resolve claims that arose from the issuance and trading of stocks. 94 But the SSE rules
were nullified because they conflicted with China's civil procedure laws.95
In 1993, the Chinese state formally recognized the legality of arbitrating securities dis-
putes. The State Council granted subject-matter jurisdiction of securities disputes to arbi-
tration in the Interim Provisions on the Management of the Issuing and Trading of
Stocks. 96 Article 79 of the Interim Provisions specifically allows concerned parties the
option to arbitrate disputes -involving the issuance and trading of stocks.9 7 Article 80 re-
quires mandatory arbitration for disputes involving the issuance and trading of stocks that
arise among securities managing organizations or between such organizations and a stock
exchange. 98
Although the Chinese state has recognized a right to arbitrate securities disputes, regu-
latory bodies in the securities industry have focused narrowly on promulgating arbitration
rules that governed disputes arising from transactions between securities firms. On Octo-
ber 11, 1994, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) promulgated the No-
tice on Arbitration of Securities Disputes. 99 The CSRC required all securities
organizations and stock exchanges to sign agreements to arbitrate any disputes that arose
from the issuance or trading of stocks, and designated the China International Economic
and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) as the supervisory body. 100
In 2004, the State Council and the CSRC jointly issued a Notice on the Arbitration of
Securities and Futures Contract.' 01 This Joint Notice has expanded the scope of securities
arbitration to disputes regarding trading of futures contracts and expanded the list of con-
cerned parties to include management firms of futures contracts, securities investment
92. See Li Lei & Huang Xiaokong, On China Stock Dispute's Arbitrage Solution, 2 SPECIAL ZONE ECON. 108
(2010).
93. See Shanghai Stock Exchange Arbitration Rules, available at http://www.518518.coin/news6513 (Aug.
30, 2010, 12:23 AM) (China).
94. Lei & Xiaokong, supra note 92, at 108.
95. Id.
96. Interim Provisions on the Management of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks (promulgated by the St.
Council, Apr. 22, 1993, effective Apr. 22, 1993), art. 79, available at http://www.eng.yn.gov.cn/yunnanEnglish
/144397762564194304/20050616/353263.html (China) [hereinafter Interim Provisions].
97. Id.
98. Id. art. 80.
99. Securities Dispute Arbitration Agreement Notice (promulgated by Securities Regulatory Commission,
Oct. 11, 1994, effective Oct. 11, 1994), available at http:/Aaw.lawtime.cn/d495363500457.html (China).
100. Id.
101. State Council Legislative Affairs Office of China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n, Notice on the Arbitration of
Securities and Futures Contract, http://www.gx-law.gov.cn/news-show.asp?id=1321 (last visited June 16, 2012)
(China) [hereinafter Joint Notice]; see Introduction of the "Do a Good Job in Securities, Futures Contract Dispute
Arbitration in Accordance with the Law" (Aug. 8, 2007), http://china.findlaw.cn/fagui/lifadongtai/20080807/
217151.html (China).
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consulting firms, and futures investment consulting firms. 102 The Joint Notice also stated
that disputes arising between listed companies and public investors will be separately
addressed. 103
Currently, CIETAC has jurisdiction to arbitrate domestic cases based on parties' agree-
ments, 10 4 and CIETAC has promulgated a set of arbitration rules to govern financial
transaction disputes that include securities and futures.105 In CIETAC's own words: "do-
mestic cases filed with CIETAC are typically multi-industry, trans-regional and interdisci-
plinary, with a trend towards an increase in those related to the new economy." 06
CIETAC's description arguably does not apply to Yinguang Xia, a blue-chip technology
company that engaged in accounting fraud-a common securities infraction encountered
by Chinese public investors. This leads to the question of which regulatory body is suited
to arbitrate securities disputes arising between listed companies and public investors.
C. SECURITIES ARBITRATION IS MORE INVESTOR-FRIENDLY THAN CIVIL LITIGATION
IN CHINA
Despite silence from the State Council and the CSRC on securities disputes arising
between public investors and listed companies, the arbitration system instated by the Arbi-
tration Law is friendlier to investor plaintiffs than civil securities litigation. First, the
Arbitration Law requires arbitrators to be experts of law or economics and finance. 10 7
Arbitrators who preside over securities claims are professionals who possess specialized
knowledge that Chinese judges may lack. Because parties to the arbitration have a right to
select their arbitration committee, Chinese public investors can choose a more appropri-
ate panel of adjudicators of securities disputes than they would in civil litigation. 108
Second, under the Arbitration Law, arbitration commissions are independent entities,
separate from state or local agencies.' 0 9 This structure isolates the arbitration process
from local or state agencies' influence. It also facilitates arbitrators to make decisions
based on law and facts rather than politics.
Third, the Arbitration Law requires the process to be contractual, which helps to place
Chinese public investors and companies on more equal grounds." 0 For instance, arbitra-
tion's contractual nature frees parties from the "plaintiff accommodates defendant princi-
ple" in determining venue, unlike in Chinese civil litigation. Arbitration affords parties
the opportunity to determine by contract which arbitration commission will adjudicate the
dispute.ll In addition, parties can contractually select specific provisions from existing
102. Joint Notice, supra note 101.
103. Id.
104. See China Int'l Econ. & Trade Arbitration Comm'n Arbitration Rules, (revised and adopted by the
China Council for the Promotion of Int'l Trade, Feb. 3, 2012, effective May 1, 2012), art. 3(l)-(2), available at
http://www.cietac.org/index/rules.cms (China).
105. Id. art. 2(11).
106. China Int'l Econ. & Trade Arbitration Comm'n, About Us - Introduction, http://www.cietac.org/index/
aboutUs.cms (last visited June 16, 2012) (China).
107. Arbitration Law, supra note 63, art. 12.
108. Id. art. 30.
109. Id. art. 14.
110. Id. art. 16.
111. Id. art. 16(3).
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Chinese laws and rules that would apply in the event that arbitration becomes necessary.
Thus, parties are free to tailor the arbitration process to their specific needs. Parties can
even contract to have the arbitration committee make a decision based on the parties'
pleadings alone. 12 The flexibility arbitration offers makes the process quicker and more
economical than compared to the Chinese civil judicial system.
This paper acknowledges the possibility that public investors and companies may have
unequal bargaining power, and thus, investors may never realize the advantages provided
by arbitration's contractual nature. But compared with civil securities litigation where
judicial rules, such as the "plaintiff accommodates defendant principle," dictate a higher
burden on public investors from the start, the contractual nature of arbitration at least
provides aggrieved investors the possibility of a leveled playing field.
V. Securities Arbitration under FINRA
A. VALUE OF FINRA's SECURITIES ARBITRATION SYSTEM TO CHINA
Thus far, this paper has discussed China's civil litigation infrastructure and some of the
difficulties Chinese public investors face when they seek civil damages against listed com-
panies. This paper has also suggested that arbitration is a viable alternative for Chinese
investors because the Arbitration Law of China is friendlier to investor plaintiffs than the
civil system. This paper has noted that although the State Council and the CSRC have
promulgated rules for securities arbitration, those rules do not comprehensively address
disputes between public investors and listed companies. The existing gap in regulation
provides an opportunity for China to look towards the arbitration system established by
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) for guidance and improvement.
B. FINANcIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AuTHoRIY
The seminal moment in American securities arbitration happened in 1987 when the
Supreme Court of the United States confirmed the validity of a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement in the securities claims context.113 Since then, virtually all securities firms have
included arbitration agreements in their contracts with customers to secure the right of
arbitration, establishing mandatory arbitration as the standard in the securities industry.' 1 4
The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has the "expansive power" to ensure the
adequacy of the arbitration rules and procedures promulgated by the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD), a self-regulatory organization of the securities industry. i5
In 2007, the SEC used its expansive oversight power to approve NASD's proposal to
112. Id. art. 39.
113. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 220-21 (1987).
114. A Review of the Securities Arbitration System Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov't Sponsored
Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Constantine Katsoris, Fordham
University School of Law Professor) (testifying that McMabon transformed securities arbitration "from a
voluntary procedure to a mandatory one"), available at http://archives.financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/
031705cgk.pdf.
115. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233-34; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2006).
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consolidate the NASD and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) arbitration forums-
giving birth to FNRA.116
Arbitration under FINRA encompasses all securities industry disputes that arise be-
tween member firms and their customers.1 17 The FINRA Manual, which remains a work-
in-progress as FINRA continues to consolidate NASD Conduct Rules and NYSE
Rules,' 8 provides the procedural requirements of FINRA's dispute resolution. Under the
Manual, any agreements with investors that contain a pre-dispute arbitration clause must
have the clause highlighted. 19 Even absent a written arbitration clause, investors may still
request arbitration. 20 The arbitration clause cannot limit the ability of an investor to file
an arbitration claim or the ability of an arbitrator to determine an award.' 2' Investors
have six years from the occurrence of the event that gave rise to the dispute to file a
claim.122 Domestic arbitration hearing locations are generally determined based on the
customer's residence at the time the dispute arose.' 2 3 To file a claim, a party must submit
an initial statement of claim specifying the relevant facts and remedies requested with
FINRA.124 After the initial statement of claim, the responding party has forty-five days to
answer. 125 If the responding party does not timely file its answer, upon motion, the arbi-
trational panel may bar the responding party from presenting a defense.
26
Depending on the nature of the claim, either a single arbitrator or a panel of three
arbitrators may preside over each case.' 27 A claim that is $50,000 or less is automatically
heard by a single arbitrator, and the claim is subject to a simplified arbitration proceed-
ing. 128 A single arbitrator will preside over such a proceeding, and no hearing will be held
unless the customer requests a hearing. 129 If the claim is more than $50,000 but less than
$100,000, the panel will consist of one arbitrator unless the parties agree in writing to
three arbitrators. 13° For a claim that is more than $100,000, that is unspecified, or that
does not request money damages, the panel will consist of three arbitrators, unless the
parties agree in writing to one arbitrator.131
FINRA uses the Neutral List Selection System, a computer system that generates ran-
dom lists of arbitrators for proceedings. 132 Each party can select their arbitrators through
116. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD to Implement Govern-
ance and Related Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56145, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,169-01, at 42,188 (Aug. 1,
2007).
117. See Arbitration Overview, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/Arbitrationand
Mediation/Arbitration/Overview (last visited June 3, 2012).
118. See Financial Industry Regulatory Authority Rules, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. ArsTHoRrrv, http://www.
finra.org/Industry/Regulation/FINRARules/ (last visited June 3, 2012) [hereinafter FINRA Manual].
119. Id. R. 2268(b)(1).
120. Id. R. 12200.
121. Id. R. 2268(d)(1)-(4).
122. Id. R. 12206(a).
123. Id. R. 12213(a).
124. Id. R. 12302(a).
125. Id. R. 12303(a).
126. Id. R. 12308(a).
127. See id. R. 12401.
128. Id. R. 12401(a).
129. Id. R. 12800(a)-(c).
130. Id. R. 12401(b).
131. Id. R. 12401(c).
132. Id. R. 12400(a).
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a process of ranking and striking the arbitrators on the generated lists. 133 Depending on
whether the panel consists of one arbitrator or three arbitrators, the Neutral List Selec-
tion System draws from three separate rosters of arbitrators. 134 FINRA maintains a roster
of non-public arbitrators, a roster of public arbitrators, and a roster of arbitrators who are
eligible to serve as chairperson of a three-arbitrator panel.1 35 To qualify as an arbitrator,
applicants must have at least "five years of full-time, paid business or professional experi-
ence."'136 Prior to hearing a dispute, arbitrators must disclose any conflicts of interest
related to the dispute.' 37 A panel must render an award within thirty business days from
the date the proceeding ends, and a party must pay any monetary award rendered within
thirty days.138
FINRA also developed a set of rules, updated in 2011, to govern discovery in arbitra-
tion. 139 The Discovery Guide denotes categories of documents that are discoverable in all
customer disputes and categories that should be discoverable in certain types of dis-
putes.' 40 The guide tries to ensure that all relevant materials are exchanged between the
parties, but the parties and the arbitration panel may adjust the discovery lists based on the
issues in a particular claim.141
C. CRITICISM OF THE FINRA ARBITRATION SYSTEM
The FINRA arbitration system is not without its American critics. Some investor advo-
cates have argued that securities arbitration is unfair, inefficient, expensive, and biased
towards the securities industry.142 For example, critics of securities arbitration point out
that brokerage firms consistently try to evade and avoid their discovery obligations in
arbitration and that millions of arbitration awards continue to go unpaid. 143 Investor ad-
vocates also point out that many of the arbitrators work in the securities industry so they
would not "bite the hand that feeds [them]."' 44 Furthermore, according to some critics,
arbitrators rarely award aggrieved investors the full amount, even when the proof of dam-
age is overwhelming. 14S These are only some of the criticisms of the FINRA arbitration
system.
133. Id. R. 12402(d), 12403(c).
134. Id. R. 12402(b)(1), 12403(c)(1).
135. See id. R. 12400(b).
136. FINRA's Arbitrators, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAnd
Mediation/Arbitrators/BecomeanArbitrator/FINRAArbitrators/index.htm (last visited June 3, 2012).
137. FINRA Manual, supra note 118, R. 12405(a).
138. Id. R. 12904(d), (j).
139. Discovery Guide, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AuTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/
Arbitrators/CaseGuidanceResources/DiscoveryGuide/ (last visited June 3, 2012).
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See, e.g., Jill I. Gross, When Perception Changes Realty: An Empirical Study of Investors' Views of the Fairness
of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. Disp. REsOL. 349, 351 (2008).
143. A Review of the Securities Arbitration System Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov't Sponsored
Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of the Public Investors Arbitration Bar
Association), available at http://archives.financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/031705rs.pdf.
144. Charles Gasparino, Judging Wall Street, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 2004, at 56.
145. Gary Weiss & David Serchuk, Are Investors Walled Off From Justice?, Bus. WK., Mar. 22, 2004, at 91.
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On the other hand, one proponent of FINRA arbitration has argued that investors'
criticisms of the fairness of securities arbitration stem primarily from misunderstandings
of the law, not from defects in the arbitration process itself or failures of the arbitrators. 146
For example, if an investor believes his broker's misconduct caused his monetary losses,
yet an arbitrator fails to award damages to the investor after a hearing, then he blames the
arbitrator instead of the law upon which the arbitrator grounded his decision. 147 Hence,
the investor's misunderstandings lead to disillusionment with the process and perceptions
of unfairness. 148
VI. FINRA's Securities Arbitration System as a Model
Criticisms of the FINRA arbitration should be acknowledged, but these criticisms do
not wholly discredit the system, and FINRA has responded to the criticisms by continuing
to amend its arbitration rules. In addition, it is important to keep in mind that American
investor advocates' assessment of FNRA arbitration is formed against the backdrop of the
American legal system. China has a different legal framework. This paper does not take
the position that if FINRA's securities arbitration system is transplanted to China, all its
shortcomings will disappear. Rather, this paper simply contends that securities arbitration
is a better alternative than civil litigation for Chinese public investors, and the FINRA
arbitration system has a number of useful attributes, as discussed below, that can help
China improve its own system.
First, the jurisdiction of FINRA arbitration is broader than the Chinese system, which
under the 2004 Joint Notice is limited to disputes arising from issuance and trading stocks
or disputes involving futures contracts. 149 Under FINRA, acceptable securities arbitration
cases include disputes that arise between brokerage firms, between investors and broker-
age firms, and between investors and representatives of the firms. 150 Commonly accepted
claims include fraud, misrepresentation and omissions, negligence, unauthorized trading,
churning, failure to supervise, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract claims. 151
FINRA arbitration recognizes that public investors' rights could be violated in a variety of
contexts, but the Chinese arbitration commissions only have the authority to accept secur-
ities disputes in limited contexts. 5 2
Second, under FINRA, the duty for securities firms to arbitrate disputes is
mandatory. 153 American securities firms and their representatives are contractually bound
146. See Gross supra note 142, at 349, 395-97.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 50.
149. Interim Provisions, supra note 96, art. 79.
150. What Cases are Eligible, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. Au-tioRirr', http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAnd
Mediation/FhNRADisputeResolution/OverviewofArbitratioruMediationWhatCasesAreEigibe/ (last visited
June 3, 2012).
151. Summary Arbitration Statistics 2011, FIN. L'DUSTRY REG. AurrHOirry, http://www.finra.org/
ArbitrationAndMediation/FENRADisputeResolution/AdditionaResources/Statistics/index.htm (last visited
June 3, 2012).
152. Interim Provisions, sppra note 96, art. 79.
153. See A Review of the Securities Arbitration System Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov't
Sponsored Enters. of the H. Conm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Constantine Katsoris,
Fordham University School of Law Professor) (testifying that McMahon transformed securities arbitration
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to arbitrate disputes with public investors, even in the absence of a written contract. I5 4
The contractual obligation is not rooted in agreements with customers; rather, the obliga-
tion comes from being a member of FINRA. Because all securities firms in America are
members of FINRA, public investors can demand securities firms to arbitrate disputes155
In contrast, consumer securities cases in China are not mandatorily arbitrated, which is to
the detriment of Chinese consumers. As previously discussed, given the choice between
civil litigation and arbitration, the latter offers more advantages to public investors. But
because Chinese securities firms' contractual obligation to arbitrate is rooted in agree-
ments with customers, if Chinese securities firms do not consent to an arbitration clause,
Chinese public investors are left with civil litigation as the only remedial means for seek-
ing monetary damages.
Third, beyond providing guidance on arbitrating claims between investors and the se-
curities industry, FINRA can also help China to centralize and specialize its securities
arbitration system. Currently, securities arbitration can take place at any one of the hun-
dreds of existing arbitration commissions scattered across China.1s 6 The Chinese securi-
ties industry, like its American counterpart, can play a big rote in the supervision of
securities arbitration. The Securities Association of China (SAC), which is a self-regula-
tory organization for the securities industry, is well-positioned to function like FINRA,
but the Chinese state has yet to formally bestow that responsibility on the SAC.15 7 Unlike
CIETAC, which was created to address China's economic and trade relations with foreign
countries,158 SAC was created by China's domestic securities industry. The scope of the
SAC's responsibilities can be expanded to include shaping domestic securities arbitration
procedures, helping to establish specialized securities arbitration commissions and to
manage the selection of arbitrators. As the SAC becomes a more centralized governing
body of securities disputes, like FINRA, the SAC can enforce arbitration through mem-
bership. The SAC can also expand the classes of arbitrable claims to include disputes
arising between securities firms and customers.
Fourth, aside from centralizing arbitration, the SAC can help to promulgate investor-
friendly rules, much like FINRA's rules. For instance, emulating FINRA's rules, the SAC
can require arbitration to take place where the investor plaintiff resides.'5 9 This would be
more favorable to investors than the current rule that allows both parties to contractually
decide the location of arbitration, ignoring the unequal bargaining power between inves-
tors and securities firms. In addition, FINRA's Discovery Guide is also very g~nerous to
investors, recognizing that a majority of the evidence an investor plaintiff needs to prove a
claim is in the hands of the defendant firm. 160 The SAC can consider promulgating simi-
lar discovery rules that favor investor plaintiffs.
"from a voluntary procedure to a mandatory one"), available at http://srchives.financialservices.house.gov/
media/pdf/031705cgk.pdf.
154. FINRA R. 12200.
155. See About the Financial Indus"y Regulatory Autbority, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.
finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited June 3, 2012).
156. See SHANGLUO ARB. NETWORK, supra note 90.
157. Securities Law, supra note 22, art. 174.
158. CIETAC, About Us - Introduction, supra note 106.
159. FINRA R. 12213.
160. Discovery Guide, supra note 139.
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VII. Conclusion
After a six-year struggle in the courts, the Yinguang Xia case finally concluded in
2007.161 From its commencement in 2001, the case endured numerous judicial upheavals.
At the start, the Supreme People's Court stayed the civil suits filed by Yinguang Xia's
investors. 162 In 2002, the CSRC issued an administrative penalty against Yinguang Xia,
which triggered a two-year statute of limitations on the civil claims brought by aggrieved
investors. 163 In 2003, an intermediate court issued a criminal ruling against Yinguang
Xia. 164 Meanwhile, the statute of limitations on the civil claims continued to run. Even-
tually, the SPC had to make a special exception based on the importance of the case and
its social impact to extend the statute of limitations by three months. 65 Once the civil
claims were finally accepted in court, it took another four years for the case to conclude.
Ultimately, in 2007, the parties reached a settlement with investors accepting damages due
in the form of additional shares of Yinguang Xia. 166
Using Yinguang Xia as the entry point and the ending point, this paper has presented a
discussion of two legal remedies-civil litigation and arbitration-available to Chinese
public investors who have suffered monetary damages in their securities dealings. This
paper has argued that because of existing uncertainties and obstacles in the Chinese civil
litigation system, arbitration provides a valuable alternative method for aggrieved inves-
tors to recover damages. To further improve China's securities arbitration, China can and
should look to FINRA for guidance and improvement.
Alternative dispute resolution has been an important part of the Chinese securities in-
dustry, and there is room for arbitration to play an even bigger role if the existing short-
comings are addressed. Perhaps by the time another Yinguang Xia harms public investors,
they will be able to recover some of their monetary damages through arbitration.
161. Tao Yushen, supra note 11.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See " i-ii" l1t3 _ ("YinguangXiaAn"SusongShixiao Wu DuoTouzizhe
Liyi Shei Lai Baohu) r'Yingguan Xia Case" Statute of Limitations Running, Who Will Protect Investors' Rights],
XINHuAM'= NEWS SERV. (Feb. 6, 2004), http://news.xinhuanet.com/stock/2004-02/06/content_1301
413.htm (China).
165. Tao Yushen, supra note 11.
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